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CLIMATE MIGRANTS' RIGHT TO
ENIOY THETR CULTURE
M a rg o retho W eweri n ke- Si ng h.
I lntroduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) first observed in 1990
that 'migration and resettlement rrray be the most threatening short-term effects of
climate change on human settlements'.l Numerous studies have since confirmed
that climate change 
- 
in combination with multiple other 'stressors'- will force
an increasing number of people âcross the globe to relocate temporariþ or per-
manently to safer habitats.2 The threat of forced relocation is particularly urgenr
for Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) such as Tuvalu, Kiribari, the
Solomon Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Fiji and Vanuaru, which
arc already losing habitable territory as a result of climate change. ,{,t the same
time, empirical evidence suggests that a significant proportion of people from
low-lying PSIDS could be 'trapped' by worsening climate conditions, declining
iiving standards and few opportunities for migration or income-generation for
adaptation.3 The lack of mobility options only decreases the chances that cultural
heritage could be preserved in face of climate change, as well-managed migration
is widely recognised as a means of enhancing resilience and adaptive capaciry in
island communities.a
The potential loss of cultural heritage as a result of climate change has signifi-
cant implications for the er{oyment of human rights. PSIDS first started raising
concerns about climate change at international human rights forums more than
a decade ago.s And at the initiative of a coalition of Small Island Developing
States (SIDS) from across regions, the United Nations Human Rights Council
has recognised in e range of resolutions that climate change 'poses an immedi-
ate and far-reaching threat to people and comrnunities around the wodd and has
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights'.6 The Conference of rhe
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) has simlarly recognised the importance of human rights standards
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in the context of climate change, starting with the acknowledgment in a Cop
decision that 'þ]arties should, in all climate change-related actions, fully respect
human rights'.7 Human rights advocacy at the climate negotiations intensified
in the run-up to the 21st coP held in paris, France in 2015,8 and the paris
Agreement adopted under the UNFCCC has become the first multilateral climate
agreement to recognise States? human rights obligations.e
The Paris Agreement andits accompanying COP decisionfeature other remark-
able developments: the Paris Agreement includes a standalone article on 'Loss and
Damage', which recognises
the importance of averring, minimising and addressing loss and damage asso-
ciated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme lveather
events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in
reducing the risk of loss and damage.10
The provision also 'anchors' an ínstitution established by the Cop in 201,3 to
address loss and damage, the 'Warsaw lntemationa] Mechanism on Loss and
Damage Associated with Climate Change fltrIM), inro the Paris Agreemenr while
making it subject to the âuthority and grídance ofthe Meeting of the Parties ro rhe
Paris Agreement.ll And the COP decision accompanying the Agreement requests
the Executive Commi*ee of the WIM
to estabiish, according to its procedure and mandate, a task force to comple-
ment, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies
and expert groups under the Convention . . . to develop recoÍrmendations
for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related
to the adverse impacts of climate changeJ2
This builds on the workplan of the WIM, which calls to 'enhance the understand-
ing of and expertise on how the impacts of climate change are affecting patters of
migration, displacement and human mobiliry; and the application of such under-
standing and expertisen.l3 However, the work of the 'VZIM has so far not been
significantly informed by international human rights law. This conrribution aspires
to demonstrate the added value of a more integrated approach to human rights,
climate change and migration, which could inform the work of the future task
force of the Executive Committee of the WIM and that of other international
bodies and forums mandated to address human rights, climate change or migration.
The link bewveen climate change, the potential loss of cultural heritage and
international human rights law has been insuflicientþ explored in literature on
human rights and climate-induced migration, most of which focuses on States'
obligations arising from the right to life or the prohibition of inhumane fteat-
ment. This focus can be explained by a presumption in the literature that there is a
'normative gap' in international law relating to the protection of climate migrants,
which is supposedly apparent from the lack of protection offered under the 1957
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Refugee Conventionta and its 1967 Protocol.ls This presumption has triggered a
quest for human rights norms that might offer the refugee-type protection other-
wise provided under international refugee law, whereby the rights to life and the
prohibition of inhumane treatrnent are natural starting points for analysis.l6 This
contribution takes a different stafting point, exploring the potential of international
human rights law to provide a comprehensive framework of protection for actual
and potential climate migrants. This framework would be premised on a much
wider spectrum of obligations than mereþ obligations to provide refugee-type
proteccion, ranging from obligations to prevent loss and damage associated with
climate change through to obligations to help facilitate or finance communiry-
based relocation in a manner that enables communities to preserve their cultural
identities and traditional economies.
The focus of the analysis is on the right of persons belonging to minorities to
e4ioy their culture âs protected under Article 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR is one of the most widely
ratified international human rights treaties, with its 168 State parties including
all States listed in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC)17 and dozens of States located in areas where climate
change is projected to have serious negative impacts on human life and liveli-
hoods.18 The right to culture is also arguably enshrined in customary international
law.1e The contribution peruses the Human Rights Committee's (HRC) interpre-
tation of Article 27, wth particular attention to its link with the rights of peoþles
to selÊdetermination and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
as protected under Argicle 1 of the ICCPR and of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).2O On the basis of this analysis,
the contribution suggests that a 'norr/:.ative gap' related to the protection of cli-
mate migrants does not necessarily exist. It also sets out the broader implications
of a human rights*based protection framework, referring to State responsibility for
violations of the right to culture and international cooperation on human mobility.
ll Cultural rights, the right of self-determination and climate
change
A The right to culture ín internationøl Iøw
The right to enjoy one's own culture is based on Article 27 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to par-
ticipate fr..ly in the cultural life of the community." Article 27 of the ICCPR
provides a specific right of minorities to enjoy their own culture, while Article
15 of the ICESCR expresses the universal right 'to take paft in cultural ltfe'.z2
Similar provisions are contained in other international and regional human rights
treaties.23 Manfred Nowak points out that the right to culture protected under
Article 27 of the ICCPR \Mas pu{posefully formulated as an individual right, but
with the phrase oin community with the other members of their group' inserted
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in order to 'maintain the idea of a group',2a making it an individual right with a
collective element.zsJames Anaya, a former United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, has pointed our rhar Articie 27 in pnctice pro-
tects both group and individual':interests in cultural integriry.26 rhe càmmin.. o1
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) specifies rhat the beneficiaries of
the right are individuals, but that the right may be exercised either by a person as an
individual, in association with others, or within a communify or group, as such.27
W'ith regard to the term 'minorities', Manfred Nowak nores th;t its mean-ing partly overlaps with the tenn- 'peoples' in Arcicle 1 of the Covenant.2s
Nonetheless-as the Grand Captain of the Mikmaq Indians pointed our in a com-
plaint to the HRC on behalf of the Mikmaq Indians against Canada-the rwo
terms are to be distinguished.2e In both theory and pracricã, th"re are four require-
ments understood to be implied by the term ,minorities,, namely: (1) numerical
inferiority to rhe resr of the population; (2) being in a non-dominant position;
(3) having ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics thar are distinct from those
of the overall popularion of the State; anð, (4) showing, expiicitþ or implicitly, a
sense of solidarity.3o Importantly, the term has been interprered as including aliåns;
in other words, the term 'minorities' does not relate to nationals of a State only.ut
The HRC has gone as far as to state that just as beneficiaries of the right ,need
not be nationals or citizens, they need not be permanent residents' and thus may
include 'migrant workers or even visitors'.32 Nowak also opines that the rights
enjoyed by minorities 'should not be denied to immigrants, including migrant
workers, who entered the country only recentþ,.33
The HRC has further made it clear that indigenous communiries may consti-
tute a minority group within the meaning of the arcicle.3a It has upheld rhis view
in several complaints submitted by representatives of indigenous peoples, which
together make up most of the findings of the Comrnitree under Arricle 27.3s It
could accordingly be argued that, any group of aæual or potential climate migrants
that meets the definition of 'minorities' is entitled ro prorection of their rijnt to
culture in their State of origin as well as in a receiving State, regardless of their tegal
status or citizenship' In this context, it is important to note thar even relatively
small island nations are often composed of a myriad of culturally distinct groups.
For example, the Republic of Vanuatu has about 80 inhabired islands, a population
of about 287,00036 and 138 indigenous languages spoken by distinct cultural com-
munities, each with its own traditions and social structures.37 When speaking of
the right to culcure as protected under Article 27, it is the distinct omicro' cultur"s
of a nation that presumably attractprotection entitlements for each ofits members.
,{nd insofar as an entire nation has a distinct culdure, it might be simultaneousþ
protected by virrue of parallel instruments and provisions that are not confined to
minorities, including Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. Moreover, it would
be protected where members of the nation migrate to a third country where they
would effectively constitute a minority.
For the pu{pose of international human rights law, 'culture' is understood as
a 'broad inclusive concept encompassing all manifestations of human existence,
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which includes onatural and man-made environffIents' and the 'arts, cnstoms
and traditions through which individuals, gtroups of individuals and communi-
ties express their humaniry and the meaning they give to their existence'.3s The
HRC clarified in llrnari Lönsman u Finland3e that under Article 27, minonties or
indigenous groups have the right to the protection of traditional activities such as
hunting, fishing or reindeer husbandry.aO It noted the 'spiritual significance' ro rhe
complainants' culfure of Mount Riutusvaara (where the activities thar allegedly
interfered with the complainants' right were carried out), as well as the potential
negâtive effects of a disturbed environment on the quality of slaughtered rein-
deer.al At the same time, it found that Article 27 does not only prorecr traditional
means of livelihood of national minorities: the fact that a minority uses modern
technology to adapt its traditional means of livelihood to a modern way of iife
does not prevent it from invoking Article 27 to protect those means. The HRC
reafürmed these findings in Apirana Mahuil<a u New Zealand,az where it clarified
that economic activities may come within the ambit of Article 27 , if they are an
essential element of the culture of a community.a3 Accordingly, it found that rhe
Maori's right to enJoy the benefits of commercial fishing came within the scope
of Arcicle 27.4a This broad conception of culture is important for communities
and peoples affected by climate change: as Jessie Hohmann notes, the process of
identification of victims of human rights violations comes with the risk that the
potential victims' culture is represented as static.as The HRC's insistence that the
right to eryoy one's culture cannot be determined in abstracto but has to be placeô
in context46 prevents human rights litigation or policy from becoming an obstacle
to innovation and change, which would have potentially detrimental effects on
people's adaptive capacity.
In relation to the right of selÊdetemrination, it must be noted that the jurispru-
dence ofthe HRC reflects a strong Iink between Articies 1 and27. This link was frsr
developed in the case of Lubicon Lal<e Band v Canada,q where the indigenous Lubicon
Lake Band alleged that the permission of energy exploration by private co{porations
in the Band's territory entailed violations of the Band's right of self-determination.
Although the HRC considered the right of self*determination as nor cognisable
under the Optional Protocol, it proceeded to consider the communication under
Artícle 27 instead,as Arricle 27 hæ since provided an indirect v/ay to invoke rhe
provisions ofArticle L through the individual complaint procedure, and a significant
part of the jurisprudence of the HRC on Article 27 now reflects rhe simultaneous
expression ofthe right ofselÊdetermination. Accordingly, the reasoning ofthe HRC
in Article 27 cæes is instructive for understanding how the rights ofpeoples affected
by climate change are protected under intemational law, irrespeciive of whether the
peoples in question constitute minorities within the meaning of Amcle 27.
B ClÍmote chonge, migratíon and the right to culture
The enjoyment of the right to culture is most obviously affected by climate change
where 'culture' involves a close relationship of indigenous peoples with territory
=.-rI
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or land.ae Anthropologists have found that this relarionship is refleeted in many
indigenous cultures and languages: in, for example, the cook Islands Maori-a
language spoken by inhabitants ofislands that face inundation-'ernla' means .land,
country, territory, afterbirth'; in Futuna 'fan:ua'means ,country, land., the people
of a place'; and in Tonga, 'fonua' means 'isrand, territory, estate, the people of the
estate, placenta' and 'fonualoto', 'grave',s0 As Batibasaqa, overton and Horsley
point out, in several Poþesian languages 'pro-fanua is both the people and the
territory that nourishes them, as a placenta nourishes a baby,.sl At the same time,
however, Pacific indigenous cultures are characterised by a history of migration:
one exampie is the village of Tabara in norrh-eastern Papua New Guinea, which
has a history of fusion, division and migration extending over 130 kilomerres.s2
Traditional knowledge of navigation and canoe-building possessed by ind.igenous
peoples across the Pacific further underscores the historical importarrce ofmobility
to Pacfic indigenous cultures.s3 Still, many migrants continue to feel a linkage with
their indigenous lands, even after having lived elsewhere for considerable periods
of time's4 The loss or uninhabitable character of an indigenous rerritory breaks such
connections and threatens the cultural identity of affected peoples. Indeed, some
indigenous peoples principalty reject migration as a form of adapration ro climare
change because they consider the ties to their territory as an essential part of their
culture.ss This indicates that despite the fact that migration and mobility are some-
times inherent in indigenous culturesn the loss of indigenous peoples'land that is
- projected to occur as a result of climate change still threatens to interfere with their
cultural identity and associated human rights.
These observations are confirmed by the submissions made by SIDS to the
office ofthe High commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which emphasise
the links befween the right of selÊdetermination and traditional culture. For exam-
ple, the submission made by the Repubiic of the Marshall Islands (RMD rejecrs
the 'potential enforcement of an assertion that a low-þing, remote developing
island nation can simply "adapt" to the physical loss of its homeland and nation-
hood by removing the population to a foreign nation' as operhaps, itself a violation
of th.e fundamental human right to nationhood'.56 The submission e4plains that
the Marshallese are known for their strong emphasis on traditional culture, which
values cooperation and sharing. It specifically explains that in accordance with its
customary system of land tenure, land is 'not viewed as interchangeable real estate,
but instead as a foundation of national, cultural and personal identity and spirit'.s7
The submission concludes that '[t]he reclassification of the Marshallese as a dis-
placed nation or, looseþ defined, as "climate refugees", is not only undesirable,
but also unacceptable as an affront to self-determination and national dignity'.5s
Along similar lines, the Republic of the Maldives'has stated in a submission ro
the OHCHR that 'catastrophic climate change would [. . .] cause the denial of
the right to seiÊdetermination of the Maldives people'.se The OHCHR seemed
to follow this rationale in its analyticú, study on rhe relationship berween climare
change and human rights, where it suggested that the right of self-determinarion
could potentially be negated as a result of the adverse effects of climate change,60
¡qq
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lll State responsibility for violations of the right to culture
'V/hat 
are the implications ofthe right to culture and the right ofseif-determination
for actual and potential 'climate migrants'? To understand this, we must analyse
what Judge Huber in Spanßh Zone. of Morocco caJled'the necessary corollary of a
right', namely responsibility.ut A closer examination of the HRC's jurisprudence
sheds light on the precise requirements of the right to culture which, when vio-
lated, would result in State responsibiliuy. And an analysis of the territorial scope of
States' obligations and the law of State responsibility will shed light on the circum-
stances in which a State or State might be internationally responsible for violations
of the right to culture that are a direct or indirect result of climate change.
A Støtes' obligations to respect and ensure the right to culture
'When considering States' obügations related to the right to culture, a first point to
note is that Article 27 is the only right protected under the ICCPR that is nega*
tiveþ formulated in the treâty text. However, the HRC has consistentþ held that
Article 27 imposes positive obligations on States, based on a systematic examina-
tion of the teÍns in their context and in the light of the object andpuqpose of the
ICCPR.62 As there is nothing in the provision to the concrary, a systematic inter-
pretation of the Covenant requires that the provision be inteqpreted in accordance
with Arricle 2 of the Covenant which sets out an obligation of States 'to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant'.63 The HRC has noted that the positive obli-
gations of States will only be fully discharged if States protect individuals against
violations by its agents as well as by private persons over which it has jurisdiction,
pointing out that:
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as
required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those
rights, as a result of States Parties' permitting or failing to take appropri-
ate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or
redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.64
The positive obligations of States under the Covenant include an obligation,
spelled out in Article 2(2), to take the necessâry steps to adopt such laws or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the
Covenant.65 The Committee has stipulated that this requirement'is unqualified
and of immediate effect'.66 The HRC's position that Article 27 creates positive
obligations flows directþ from this understanding. In the view of the Committee,
Article 27 prescribes 'Positive measures of protection . . . not only against the acts
of the State party itselfi whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative
authorities, but also against the acts of other persons within the State party' .67
The HRC's assessment of States' compliarrce with obligations has focused on
both the consequences of States' âcts or omissions and the decision-making process
c
Climate migrants' right to culture 2Ol
through which the alleged violation materialised. Scheinin describes the test applied
by the HRC as a 'combined test ofparticipation by the group and sustainability of
the indigenous economy'.68 Examples of this test âre found in the HRC's views
on a series of cases against Finland brought by members of the indigenous Sami
people, conceming their traditional reindeer herding culture.6e In IJmari Länsman u
Finland,To the HRC suggested that the right contains a substantive aspect that States
are obliged to protect against interferences by private actors:
A State may understandably wish to encourage development or allow eco-
nomic activity by enterprises. The scope of irs freedom to do so is not to
be assessed by reference to a margin of appreciation, but by reference to the
obligations it has undertaken under Article 27. h*icle 27 requtes rhat a
member of a minoriry shall not be denied his right to eqjoy his own culrure.
Thus, measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will not be
compatible with the obligations under Aruícle 27.71
This rationale triggered the question of 'wherher the impact of the quarrying on
Mount Riutusvaara is so substantial that it does effectively deny the authors the
right to eqjoy their cultural rights in that regjon'.7z In considering this question,
the HRC examined the impacts of quarrying activities that had already taken place
as weli as any future activities that may be approved by the authorities. In Jouni
kinsman u Fínland,73 another case concerning reindeer herding in Finland 
"n"**ing violauion of ,{.rticle 27, this time for logging aciviries, the HRC reafürmed
that both loggrng that had akeady taken place as well as 'such iogging as has been
approved for the future and which will be spread over a number of years' needed
to be considered. In relation to both past and future activities, the question was
whether the logging was 'of such proportions as to deny the authors the right to
eryoy their culture in that atea'.74
In both cases the HRC found no violation of Article 27. In llmari Uinsman u
Finland it concluded that in the amount that had aTready taken place, the quarrying
did not constitute a denial of the complainants' right to enjoy their own cukure
considering that the complainants and their interests had been considered during
the proceedings leading up to the granting of the quarrying permit, and rhat based
on the evidence, the reindeer herding in rhe area did not appear to have been
adveneþ affected by the quarrying thath,ad,abeady taken place.Ts It also considered
the compatibility of approved future activities based on evidence submitted by the
respondent State which showed, in the view of the HRC, compliance with its
obligations: it appeared from the evidence that the Stare's authorities had'endeav-
oured to permit only quarrying which would minimise the impact on any reindeer
herding activity in Southern Riutusvaan and on the environment'.76 More spe-
cificalJy, the respondent State had been able to pïove thar reindeer husbandry \Mas
protected by national legislation, and that the obligations impose d by A*icIe 27
had been observed in the permit proceedings.TT
Jouni E. Liinsman was also decided on the basis of evidence of the State's com-
pliance with its obligations, There was no agreement as to the evidence of the
2O2 Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh
long-term impacts of the loggrng activities. Consequentþ, the HRC concluded
thatit could not find a violation ofArticle 27 on this basis alone. However, it went
on to consider a range of o¡her factors before concluding that there had been no
violation. First, it noted that that the authorities had clearþ consulted the com*
muniry to which the complainants belonged in drawing up logging plans. Second,
ic found that in the consultation the community did not reâct negatively to these
plans. Third, the State had been able to prove that the authorities had completed
the process of 'weighing [up] the complainants' interests and the general economic
interests in the area' during the decision-making process. Fourth, the HRC noted
that the national coults had considered specifically whether the proposed activities
constituted a denial of rights under Article 27. IHavtng considered these four fac-
tors, the HRC concluded that it was
not in a position to conclude, on the evidence before it, that the impact
of logging plans would be such as to amount to a denial of the authors'
rights under Article 27 or that the finding of the Court of Appeal afürmed
by the Supreme Court, misinterpreted andlor misapplied article 27 of the
Covenant in the light of the facts before it.78
In Apirana Mahuíka v New Zealand, the HRC clarified its notion of the test ir was
applying in order to assess whether or not an alleged vioiation of Article 27 had
occurred. It stated that
the acceptabiliry of measures that affect or interfere with the culturally sig-
nificant economic activities of a minority depends on whether the members
of the minoriry in question have had the opportunity to participare in the
decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they wili
continue to benefìt from their traditional economy.Te
The case concerned a settlement befween New Zealand and the Maoris to reguiate
all Maori fishing rights and interests, partly in replacement of an existing fteaty
between the State and the Maori. The complainants had not been part of an exten-
sive process of negotiations on the settlement.so However, the facts demonstrated
that New ZeaJand had engaged in a process of broad consultation before going
on to legislate and had paid specific attention to the sustainabilicy of Maori fishing
activities. The Maori were given access to agreat percentage of quotas under the
settlement, and thus effective possession of fisheries wâs returned to them. 'With
regard to commercial fìsheries, the settlement established â control system in which
Maori shared not only the role of safeguarding their interests in fisheries, but also
their effective control. As regards non-corrunercial fisheries, the Crown obligations
under the Treaty of \Vaitangi continued, and regulations were made to recognise
and provide for customary food gathering. Based on these facts, the HRC was
unable to find that the cultural rights of the complainants had been denied. It then
went on to consider the participation limb of the test. As with the kinsrnan cases,
I
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the authorities had proven that special artention had been paid to the culturalsignificance of the traditional a"riviti., rf rh" 
";;;-i"i"ants. The HRc held thatby engaging in the process of broad consurtatior, ¡Ëør. regisraring, and by payingspecific attention to the sustainability ofMaori fishing activities, the state had takenthe necessary steps to ensure that the settlement andlts enacffnent through legisla-tion were compadbie with Anicl e 27.s1
The HRC concluded all the above cases with a statement that basicaily warnedthe respondent State that compliance with Article 27 wasa continuous processinvolving systemaric consideratìon of the impact of the state,s activities and theactivities of private actors on the.eq¡oymenJof currural rights by minorities. InIlrnari üinsman it even suggested that the very activities that were subject of thecommunication could give rise to a violation i¡ difi,'erent circumstances: it statedthat if mining activities in the Angeri area were approved on a large scale and sig_nificantly expanded by those compani"s to 
-hi.h'pennits had been issued, thenthis might constiture a vioration or rrr. complainant,, ,ight under Articre 27. rtreiterated that 'future economic activities *rrrr, in order to comply with Articre27 
' 
be carried out in a waY that the authors continue to benefit from reindeerhusbandry',82 andthat the state parry was ,under a dutyto bear this in mind wheneither extending existing contracts or granting ,r.* orr.r,.E3 Similarþ , in ApiranaMahuika the committee clarified that in the funherimplemenrarion ofthe relevanrIegislation the statç was obliged to bear in mind that lmeasures affecting the eco-nomic activíties of Maori must be carried out in a waythat the authors continue toenjoy their culture, and profess and practice their religion in community with othermembers of their group'.84 These ,rì.*, do not just indicate the broader objectiveof compliance with hurrran rights obligations, úu, ,r. also a clear demonstrationof an application of the principle embodied in Article 15 of rhe Inrernarional LawCommission's Arricles on the Responsibitity of States fb, I;;;ffi;;i"#iActs (i'e. that aviolarion *ry 
"orrrirt of a colporir. ,.i o, practice).ss This consori_dates the interpretation of Arcicl e 27 as giving rise ro a bråad spectrum of positiveand negative obligations, which may inciude ãbügations ro adopr laws and poiiciesto prevent deprivations of the right to culture that would result from dangerous cli-mate change' This inteqpretation begs for furrher examination of the circumstancesin which violations of these obrigations may be estabrished.
B LÍnkÍng odverse effects of crímate chønge on the en¡oyment ofthe rÍght to culture to wrongful conduct
'v/here it is alleged that the right to cuhure is being violated in connection withthe adverse effecrs of climate 
.h.rrg., several n;rrrå;;;;ring ro srare responsi_biliry emerge. At the ourset, th. ,riort pressing question is which state would beresponsible for alleged viorations. The jurisprud.rr., discussed above appears robe of little assistance in answering this question: as most existing human rightsjurisprudence, it concerns cases brought by peoples and individuals againsr theirown state' The question of which Stal* was potenriaily responsibie for rhe alleged
,._
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violations therefore did not arise in these cases. In contrast, cases of human rights
infringements involving climate change, migration and mobility could irrrràlrre
wrongfrrl conduct attributable to multiple States. Ir seems unlikely that actual
or potential climate migrants would exclusiveþ seek to hold their home stare
accountable for their grievances, given that those states often lack significant
control over the causes of climate change and have limited adaptive capaciqr
to preserve the habitability of islands, while depending on rhe *rr.y of third
States for the cÎeation of international mobility options for their nationals. In all
likelihood, meaningful licigation would address stares rhar made significant con-
tributions to historical emissions whle possessing the means to provide affected
states with adaptation finance and their inhabitants with migration options.Bc
An importânt question to address, then, is the territorial scope of States' obliga-
tions under international human rights law, including in parricular the ICCpR. A
first point to note in this regard is that the personal scope of international human
rights treaties-with the exception of those that protect the rights of specific
groups-appears to be unrestricted. Indeed, the texts of human rights treaties sug-
gest that the beneficiaries of human rights obligations include, as per the UDHR,
'all human beings', save for certain rights ofpolitical participation that are confined
to 'citizens' or rights that specifically protect 'peoples' or 'minorities'. lye should
also note that the right of selÊdetermination provided for in Article I of the lg66
Covenants imposes ransnational obligations per se, as ,peoples'm4y comprise the
entire population of a State-in which case its protection necessarily depends on .
the conduct of other States.sT The HRC highlighred this in its General Comment on
the Ríght to Sef-Determination of Peoples, stating thar Stares' obligations under Article
1 exist 'not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples which
have not been able ro exercirse or have been deprived of the possibility oiexercising
their right of seH-determination'. s8
Article 2(I) of the ICCPR provides that States must respect and ensure rhe
rights of individuals 'within its territory and subject to its jurisdicrion'. The HRC
has insisted thar this provision musr be read in coqiunction with Anicle 5(1),
which states rhat
Nothing in the present covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised herein
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present
Covenant.se
It also emphasises the need to take account of the object and purpose of the rreary
and the principle of pacta sunt seruanda when considering the scope and nature of
States' obligations.e0 Accordingly, it considers that the word 'anJ' in Article 2(1)
must be interpreted disjunctively. The disjunctive reading of the word ,and, has
been endorsed by the International Court ofJustice in its Wall opinionel and in
the literaturc.e2In relation to the phrase 
'subject to its jurisdiction', the HRC has
I
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clarified that the relevant test to apply for establishing jurisdiction is whether a
State has control over a situauion or instrumentality that affects the eqjoyment of
Covenant rights.e3
In the context of climate change, an argument could accordingly be made that
by virttre of Articles 27 and 1 of the ICCPR, States with jurisdicrion or conrrol
over private entities whose activities contribute to climate change incur positive
obligations to protect the culturally significant economic activities of minorities or
peoples that are threatened by climate change. These obligations would arise irre-
spective of the location of the minorities or peoples. Srares also presúmably have
an obligation to provide these beneficiaries with the opportunity to participate in
the decision-making process related to the activities that could atr cttheir rights.
Measures that deprive cultural minorities or peoples from the ability to benefit
from their traditional economy altogether are outright prohibited, as is clear from
the HRC's rejection of a margin of appreciation to allow economic activities that
deprive beneficiaries of this right. Moreover, insofar as climate change-induced
migration is syrnptomatic of a denial of the right to enjoy a culture, one or several
States might be under an obligation to provide an adequate and effective rem-
edy to climate migrants as a result of having faled to control private activities
that cause climate change. These obligations would arise where a State's failure
to address climate change can be characterised as 'wrongful' under intemational
human rights law. In a similar vein, a State's fälure to provide relevant assistance to
States affected by climate change might be characterised as a wrongful act that trig-
gers obligations to provide affected peoples with an adequate and effective remedy.
It is sometimes suggested that Article 2(1) wouid be too. widely inrerprered
if it would prohibit activities that have the cumulative, indirect, remore and
unintended consequence of impinging on human rights. However, doctrinal anal-
ysis supports the opposite conclusion, nameþ that a substantive provision of the
Covenant read in light of Artícle 2(L) does have the capacity ro render some of
these activities unlawfirl under international law. First of all, there is no causal
requirement inherent in either international human rights law or the general law
of State responsibility. In other words, establishing a causal línk berween a human
rights deprivation on the one hand and the âct or omission of a parricular State is
not required to prove the existence ofa human rights violation per se. Illustrative is
the European Courl of Human Rights (ECtHR)'s decision in Tatar C. Roumanie,
where the Court higtrlighted that 'even in the absence of scientific probabiliry
about a causal link, the existence of a serious and substantial risk to health and
well-being' of the applicants imposed on the State oa positive obligarion to adopt
adequate measures capable of protecting the rights of the applicants to respect for
their private and farnily life and, more generally, to the er{oymenr of a healtþ and
protected environment'.ea It is clear from this judgment, which reflects the gen-
eral law of State responsibilify,es that a failure to âct in accordance with a positive
obligation will be attributed to the State and trigger the Srare's responsibiliry if the
State was bound by the obligation. It wíll not be necessary to link the omission
to a specific organ or agent.e6 Thus, instead of requiring immediacy, directness,
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proximity or intention in relaúon to human rights deprivations, human rights law
renders State conduct potentially unlawful by virtue of allowing conduct that puts
human rights at serious risk. The law of State responsibility suggests that several
States could be held individually responsible for the same or similar risþ conduct.eT
As responsibility is established on a case-by-case basis, there is no question of mul-
tiple states being simultaneously responsible without having regard'to differing
circumstances. Indeed, precisely those differing circumstances will be considered
in determining whether or not â stâte's conduct is lawlùl in light of its obligations
to respect and ensure the right to culture.
Foreseeability will be a key question in litigation on the right to culture and cli-
mate change. In other words, judicial or quasi-judicial bodies will need to consider
whether the risk of denial of the right is, to some extent, a foreseeable conse-
quence of the State's conduct. In the context of climate change and migrâtion,
foreseeability must be considered in light of the overwhelming body of scientific
evidence that unambiguousþ links the emission of greenhouse gases with changes
in the Earth's climate system. More specifically, it has been recognised since at
least L990, when the IPCC issued its first Assessment Report, that anthropogenic
climate change has the potentiai to render island territories uninhabitable. And
as noted above, the same report highlighted migation and resettlement as likely
consequences of climate change. In light of the principle of effectiveness, it seems
unlikely that human rights bodies would require complainants in climate change
cases to prove that the specifìc harm suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the"
specific State's conduct, as imposing such a stringent test could effectiveþ deprive
millions of people of a remedy for potential violations of their right to culture.
Instead, the foreseeability of specific human rights violations would again need
to be considered on a case-by-câse basis, taking account of the State's actual or
assumed knowledge about the causes and consequences of climate change at the
time the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred.
The HRC'sjurisprudence underAnicle2T already shows a tendency to consider
a wide range offactors in determining whether a State has breached its obligations
to respect and ensure the right to culture. As we have seen above, the Committee
tends to coqsider the impact ofthe perrrritted activities on the minorities' traditional
culture, details of consuitation processes and decisions of national courts. In decid-
ing cases involving alleged violations of the right to culture resulting from climate
change, human rights bodies could also take account ofparallel obligations under
the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, inciuding obJigations
to provide technology, finance and capacíty building to developing countries in
accordance with the principle of 'common but diffetentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities'.e8 Taking account of these differentiated obligations would
lead to inteqpretations of States' human rights obligations that reflect States' his-
torical contributions to climate change and theír capacíty to realise not only the
rights of their own people but also rights of actual or potential climate migrants
from third countries.ee The need to consider a wide range offactors in establishing
violations of the right to culture also prevents a scenario where virtualiy every State
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is responsible for violations of the right, as only in certain circumstances a state,sconduct-or rather, a state's practice-relating to climate change will be consid-
ered wrongfül in light of Arucle 27.
In accordance with the general law of state responsib ility, aState that has actu-
ally violated its obligations to respe.t and ensure the right iá .rrr"r"äJätrr.,r,
additional obligations ro cease the wrongfirl conduct rrrã rr*. r,rl *p"*øns forinjury caused by-tl. âct.100 The responsibiliry of States for human righrs violarions
could be invoked by one or several States against one or several othen, or by indi-
viduals through intemational human rights bodies.1o1 The role of States ¿ffectedby climate change in enforcing obligations pertaining to the right to culture isimportant considering that states where minorities oi peoples reside presumabiyhave a right, and perhaps an obligation, ro asseft and defend ;"i;;.'il.;, n*n,to culture rather than, as Dinah sherton puts it, ,remaining passive *ta,riii^rr.rydefending itself for alleged rights-violating acts and omissions'.1.2 The iniriative
of PSIDS to consider a Pacific climate Treary rhat would protecr culcural righrs
while seeking redress for loss and damage associated with climate change could be
seen as away of defending the rights of Pacificisland peoples on the i¡ìtemational
plane.103 Minorities and peoples affected by climate ,härrg. also have , .*.i* ,oì.to play in identifying and developing suitable remedies for violations of their rightto cuhure, as restoration of the enjo¡rment of the right necessarily entails regaining
autonomy over their lives and livelíhoods. This requires that these minoriães ¿nd'peoples have a'seat at the table'where responses to the adverse affects of climate
change and mobility andrelocation options are being developed or negotiated.
lV Concluding remarks
The HRC's jurisprudence related to the right to culture suggests that states,
existing obligations to ensure actual and potenti aI climate migrants, right to cul-ture are broad and fapreaching. The implemenrarion of thesá obligati"ons mightbe hampered by lack of insight into their precise meaning and scope in the
context of climate change. However, this contribution has demonstrated thar
süates' discretion relating to a range of issues relevant to the protection of cultural
rights in the face of climate change and migration 
- 
including mitigation ambi-tion, the provision of fìnancial, technologic a7 and, capacíqr_iuildirrg supporr rodeveloping countries and the response to climate-induced migration once peopledecide to move 
- 
is limited by these existing obligations. More specifically, stares
with control over the actors or instrumentalities that cause climate .harrg. hau.
obligations to prevent forced migration through climate change mitigation and
support fot adaptation. There are parallel obiigarions ro consult with cultural
minorities and peoples about measures that mighc interfere with their traditional
economies' These requirements exist irrespective of the location or nationality
of those whose human rights are affected. The binding nature of these require*
ments means that the law of state responsibilicy *ill be engaged where oi.. o,
several States fail to meet them. states that arc responsible for violations will have
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incurred an obligation to restore the enjoyment of the right to culture wherebenefi ciaries are experiencing deprivations.
Human rights bodies and experts could be instrumental in understanding howthe right to culture could be meaningfully invoked to deal with climar. .ri"rrg.-induced migration. Human rights bodies could offer clarificarion of the pr.årr*
scope of relevant obligations at their own initiative or, when confronted withpetitions, in light of the specific facts of a case. In the view of the present 
""rnrï,a proactive stance of human rights bodes is desirable given the strenuousness ofthe task of inteqpreting obligations wirh both transnatiãnal and local dimensions.Ex postfacto litigation might serve to provide selected victims with a remedy, butis highty unükely to offer the comprehensive clarifìcarion needed. to guide srares,
responses to actual and potential climate*induced migration. Members of human
rights treaqt bodies, Special procedures of the uN Human Rights council andother members of the internationar human rights community should therefore
engage directly in the work of the WIM, including its Task Force on displacement,
to ensure tåat human rights obtigations inform the ,"sporrses to actual and potential
climate-induced migration that might be developed æ the national, regional andintemational levels. At the same time, experts and decision makers need-to engâge
with minorities and peoples affected by climate change in order ,o ,"Gg.r"r¿"rt 
"right to culture in the design of such ráporrr"r.
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